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Abstract. A suitable strategy for network intrusion tolerance—detecting
intrusions and remedying them—depends on aspects of the domain being
protected, such as the kinds of intrusion faced, the resources available
for monitoring and remediation, and the level at which automated reme-
diation can be carried out. The decision to remediate autonomically will
have to consider the relative costs of performing a potentially disrup-
tive remedy in the wrong circumstances and leaving it up to a slow, but
more accurate, human operator. Autonomic remediation also needs to
be withdrawn at some point – a phase of recovery to the normal network
state.
In this paper, we present a framework for deploying domain-adaptable
intrusion-tolerance strategies in heterogeneous networks. Functionality
is divided into that which is fixed by the domain and that which should
adapt, in order to cope with heterogeneity. The interactions between de-
tection and remediation are considered in order to make a stable recovery
decision. We also present a model for combining diverse sources of mon-
itoring to improve accurate decision making, an important pre-requisite
to automated remediation.
1 Introduction
Network intrusion tolerance—detecting intrusions and remedying them—can be
carried out manually or automatically, with various trade-offs of time and reli-
ability. The choice is influenced by the resources available to the organization
responsible for protecting a network. The kinds of attacks faced and the actual
detection and remediation mechanisms may also vary depending the kind of
network to be protected.
Automating intrusion tolerance could be problematic if it is applied in the
wrong circumstances (e.g., a node is isolated because it is incorrectly supposed
to be compromised). Also, when a temporary remedy is applied automatically, it
may affect the original detection of the intrusion, and one must consider whether
to use that original detection mechanism to also detect the end of the intrusion
and withdraw the remedy automatically.
As part of the INTERSECTION project [1], we have devised a framework
for deploying security and resilience strategies against intrusions in networks.
Here, we discuss its design relating to the problems of heterogeneity, and the
automation of both deployment and withdrawal of mitigation mechanisms.
This section continues by discussing the problems of automating remedia-
tion to achieve intrusion tolerance, and how to achieve it in heterogeneous en-
vironments. Section 2 surveys intrusion-detection systems and touches on some
systems that enable automatic remediation. Section 3 presents a framework for
deploying intrusion-tolerant systems. Section 4 describes how a part of the frame-
work is to be implemented to improve confidence of the initial detection.
1.1 To automate intrusion tolerance
Automation of network intrusion tolerance is desirable because of the unpre-
dictability of attacks and the time taken by human operators to respond manu-
ally, which could otherwise lead to significant loss of service and financial cost.
However, an automated intrusion-tolerance system that overreacts to an anoma-
lous but innocent event can also be costly, so a balance must be struck between
fast automation and more accurate but slow manual control.
The decision to perform different forms of remediation automatically will
involve a trade-off between the potential impact on the threatened service if
detection is mistaken and the cost of human intervention. An intensive attack
will require an immediate response, even if it’s not an ideal solution (involving
some cost of its own), as it may take several hours for an operator to come up
with a better solution. The cost of doing nothing in the meantime outweighs the
cost of doing the automatic response.
This balance may vary across domains. Network-based malicious behaviour
is becoming increasingly profit-driven, as attacks have shifted from being mostly
targeted at large governmental and commercial organisations towards more profit-
yielding small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs), and individuals. Larger organisa-
tions can afford 24-hour staffing, thereby reducing the need for automation and
the risks of false positives. This is more difficult for SMEs, who may prefer to
risk downtime for false positives if they can automatically recover quickly too.
1.2 Intrusion tolerance in heterogeneous environments
The hardware and software resources available for intrusion tolerance may vary
significantly. For example, on a wireless mesh network (WMN) [17], there may be
little in the way of resources, and those available may be highly constrained mesh
devices; whereas in an enterprise setting, dedicated hardware may be available.
Related to this point are the probable attacks a domain may face. For example,
an end-system on a community WMN is unlikely to be the victim of a TCP
SYN attack (as the most likely victims, servers, are better placed on a wired
network), which is distinct from the servers of a large financial institution.
This situation suggests that the mechanisms available for monitoring network
traffic with the aim of detecting attacks, and the strategies for remedying them
are very much specific to a domain. While the attacks that can occur within a
domain are likely to be domain-specific, they will be drawn from a set of known
attacks or attack types. This suggests that re-usable approaches to detecting
attacks and general strategies for dealing with them (that can use locally-relevant
monitoring and remediation mechanisms) can be developed.
2 Related Work
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) can be classified as belonging to two main
groups, depending on the detection technique employed: anomaly detection and
misuse detection, also known as signature detection [5]. Both techniques depend
on the existence of a reliable characterization of what is normal and what is
not, in a particular networking scenario. Anomaly detection techniques base
their evaluations on a model of what is normal, and classify as anomalous all
the events that fall outside such a model. Indeed, if anomalous behaviour is
recognized, this does not necessarily imply that an attack activity has occurred.
Thus, a serious problem exists with anomaly detection techniques which generate
a great amount of false alarms. Conversely, the primary advantage of anomaly
detection is its ability to discover novel attacks.
An example anomaly detection system is presented in [10], where the au-
thors propose a methodology to detect and classify network anomalies by means
of analysis of traffic feature distributions; they adopt entropy as a metric to
capture the degree of dispersal or concentration of the computed distributions.
NETAD [13] detects anomalies based on analysis of packet structure: the system
flags suspicious packets based on unusual byte values in network traffic.
The most known open-source signature-based intrusion detection systems are
SNORT [6] and BRO [14]. These systems allow the user to define a customized
set of rules in order to codify specific types of attacks. P-BEST [12] is a signature-
based intrusion detection system able to detect computer and network misuse
by means of a rule translator, a library of run-time routines, and a set of garbage
collection routines.
There are approaches that aim to ensure network security by exploiting traffic
monitoring information. In [2] and [16], the authors describe how to correlate
netflow system and network views for intrusion detection. Their approach is
human-driven, since they propose to use visualization tools in order to obtain
useful information for security purposes. This approach demonstrates how data
collected by flow monitoring systems can be used in the context of intrusion
detection. In [3] and [11], data coming from both network monitoring and system
logs are correlated in order to detect potential attacks. The authors prove that
using data from more sources increases IDS performance. However, system logs
are not always available, as in the case of servers owned by Internet providers.
Automatic remediation can cause problems if not applied to genuine intru-
sions. In [7], the authors highlight how automated intrusion response is often
disabled due to the cost of responding to too many false positives. Their solu-
tion is to balance the cost of restarting more components of a system against
the cost of not restarting enough, to produce an optimum response strategy even
with uncertainty about the intrusion. In [4], an automatic approach to mitigat-
ing the effects of large volumes of ARP traffic caused by the scanning behaviour
of Internet worms on switched networks is presented. ARP requests are dropped
probabilistically in proportion to rate, and this is effective against supposedly
compromised systems which generate the higher rates. However, it is shown the
network’s gateway router is unfairly affected, as it legitimately generates many
ARP requests too.
3 The INTERSECTION Framework
The main goal of the INTERSECTION project [1] is to provide an infrastructure
for heterogeneous networks to be resilient and secure in the face of intrusions,
and to interoperate to achieve that resilience and security. We now present a
framework for deploying intrusion-tolerance strategies that can adapt to heter-
geneous domains, and is thus able to meet that goal.
The functions of our framework, as shown in Fig. 1, form a control loop that
enables automatic intrusion tolerance, and the intervention of a network oper-
ator when necessary. To summarise, the network generates raw data about its
traffic, Monitoring and Detection reduce this to simpler signals, and the remain-
ing functions feed orders back into the network to either defeat an attack or
mitigate its effects.
To address the problem of heterogeneity and enable the development of re-
usable strategies for detection and remediation, we separate domain-agnostic
components Detection and Reaction from domain-specific components Monitor-
ing and Remediation. Detection and Reaction together embody a strategy for de-
termining the existence of an attack and a response to it, while Monitoring and
Remediation respectively implement how traffic is collected from the network and
how strategies are applied.
The trade-off that determines under what circumstances automated remedia-
tion should be used is realised through the configuration of Reaction components.
Detection components inform Reaction of the existence and severity of perceived
malicious behaviour. Reaction then determines a course of action, also depending
on available remediation mechanisms. If appropriate, Visualisation components
are used to aid a network operator when making decisions about what remedi-
ation activities to invoke, by providing details of the current attack and other
network state.
3.1 Monitoring and Detection
IDSs use information on network traffic in order to detect ongoing malicious ac-









Fig. 1. The INTERSECTION framework
the network status improves the detection process. For example, a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is performed by systems that are widely dis-
tributed throughout the network. In order to effectively detect such attacks,
information regarding a number of active traffic flows and different network en-
tities is required. Such entities share the same “purpose” (i.e., to jeopardize
either a service or a single host) and make use of the same resources (e.g., those
belonging to the network infrastructure) in order to accomplish their task. They
cooperate in order to achieve the same objective. This malicious cooperation can
be detected only if a wide-scope analysis of traffic flows is performed.
This kind of analysis requires using coarser grained flow definitions which
convey, for example, the traffic from different sources to one destination. Since
the amount of resources needed for measurement and reporting increases with
the level of granularity required to detect an attack, a multi-step monitoring
approach is useful. We call this approach adaptive monitoring. An approach to
granularity adaptive attack detection is presented in [9].
In the framework, the Monitoring function encompasses all mechanisms for
observing traffic in the network and condensing the information about it (e.g.,
by gathering statistics into flows, or observing simple statistics about the whole
network). Detection configures Monitoring to receive data from it, and attempts
to interpret that data as anomalous or indicative of an intrusion. As a result,
it may simply report that an anomaly is detected, or it may report the degree,
plus other parameters such as the end-systems to which it pertains, or the level
of confidence it has that a genuine intrusion is taking place. Importantly, it may
also reconfigure Monitoring to obtain greater detail temporarily, in order to make
a better determination, hence the level of monitoring is adapted according to
the need to make more detailed detection decisions.
The choice of Monitoring functions is fixed by the configuration of the network
– development here is driven by hardware and associated management software.
In contrast, Detection mechanisms may be added to the network dynamically –
a programmer works here to improve intrusion tolerance.
3.2 Reaction and Remediation
Reaction represents pre-determined decisions or logic for handling anomalies re-
ported by Detection. Options include reporting the anomaly through IDMEF
[8] to other domains, reporting it to a network operator via Visualization, and
requesting more information via Detection. Through a chain of detections and
reactions, the system may detect more sophisticated intrusions without applying
intrusive or resource-hungry network monitoring at all times.
Remediation encompasses all mechanisms provided by the network for de-
feating an intrusion, or for mitigating its effects. It is an option for Reaction
to trigger Remediation having detected a particular kind of intrusion, and might
(for example) isolate a compromised node from its peers, or rate-limit its probing
attempts. This activity might occur even before an intrusion is fully identified,
i.e., at earlier points in the “chain of detections and reactions”.
Again, there is a similar distinction between Reaction and Remediation as
there is between Monitoring and Detection – the Remediation mechanisms avail-
able in a network are fixed, i.e., determined by its configuration, while Reaction
mechanisms may be added dynamically.
3.3 Visualization and the Operator
Autonomic remediation will not be enough to deal with the evolution of attacks
in the long term. Most forms will involve a certain cost to the network as an
alternative to a possible catastrophic cost of network failure, and they may need
Operator interaction to determine when to be switched off. The Operator may
also be required to deal with new attacks (typically appearing as anomalies) for
which a trustworthy autonomic remedy has not yet been devised or deployed.
The Visualization function covers the reporting of attacks and anomalies to the
Operator, and may receive such signals from Reaction, or additional details from
Detection and Monitoring. Visualization together with the Operator could be re-
garded as a form of remediation – they complete the control loop back to the
network with a slow path.
3.4 Recovery
Applying a remedy indefinitely could be costly. Some remedies involve only a
one-off cost, but thereafter cost nothing, and could be left applied. Indeed, they
could be applied even before any intrusion or anomaly is detected. They consist
of patches to fix infrequent bugs and exploits, and changes to newer, more robust
protocols.
In contrast, some remedies can only be applied temporarily because they
impede the normal operation of some part of the network, and should be with-
drawn as soon as possible. These include isolation of compromised nodes (fixed
by disinfecting and patching the nodes), and blocking of attack traffic (fixed by
detecting the end of an attack) — not eventually withdrawing these remedies
renders the affected node’s participation in the network pointless. The necessary
withdrawal of a remedy to achieve normal operation is referred to as recovery.
How should the end of an attack be detected? Two choices are:
1. To re-use Monitoring and Detection, which originally reported the attack, to
also report its termination.
2. To get Remediation to perform very anomaly-specific and narrow-scope mon-
itoring at its deployment locations (and perhaps report back to Reaction to
make a wide-scope decision to withdraw).
In the first case, there are several options:
Remediation-Monitoring interaction Remediation could inform Monitoring of
what it is doing, e.g., which flows it is blocking, and report flows that Mon-
itoring no longer should see.
A problem with this approach is that it couples Monitoring and Remediation.
This potentially requires devising a complex expression of what Remediation
is doing, in order forMonitoring to understand it, or would make it harder for
Monitoring and Remediation implementations to be developed independently.
Monitoring non-interference In its reports to Reaction, Detection could indi-
cate the monitoring sources which precipitated those reports. Reaction could
use this to deploy remedies at locations that protect the victim but do not
affect Monitoring; Detection then will later signal the end of the attack.
Monitoring migration Reaction informs Detection where it is applying Reme-
diation, and so Detection adjusts the location of Monitoring to be able to
continue to detect the attack.
This approach seems impractical. Firstly, the possible locations for Monitor-
ing are likely to be fixed, or if they are good enough when moved, why not
simply monitor at the preferred locations anyway? Secondly, two different
remedies applied independently at the same time may impose contradictory
requirements on Monitoring.
Additionally, all of these approaches do not fit well with recovery that re-
quires a manual trigger (e.g., acknowledging that a compromised node has been
cleaned), as it implies that the Operator must also try to convince Monitoring
that the threat has passed, instead of simply withdrawing the remedy directly.
Furthermore, if Detection is based on traffic from the victim (e.g., anomalous
responses to an attack), any successful remedy will surely stop these from hap-
pening.
Therefore, we follow the second case, i.e., Remediation should do its own
narrow-scope monitoring to detect the end of the attack. This has the following
advantages: it leaves Remediation decoupled from Monitoring; the relative posi-
tions of Remediation and Monitoring become irrelevant; and Detection can still
be based on the victim’s response. However, the decision to withdraw can still
be placed with Reaction; this will gather reports from Remediation to make a de-
cision based on the wider view it has of the attack, which individual Remediation
deployments do not.
3.5 Example Scenario
To demonstrate how the INTERSECTION framework can be applied, we present
an example scenario, which is depicted in Fig. 2. In this scenario, a Web server is
being subjected to a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. The domain























Fig. 2. Use of the INTERSECTION components in an example scenario
The edge router associated with the Web server is able to monitor incoming
and outgoing traffic volumes. This summarised information is passed to a detec-
tion component, labelled as step one in Fig. 2, which uses this information to
detect the onset of problems associated with an attack. Xie et al. [15] describe
an algorithm that enables the detection of the onset of problems associated with
a flash crowd (or similarly, a DDoS attack) on a Web server, which uses a dis-
parity between the expected response traffic volume and the actual traffic seen
by monitoring, to suggest either network congestion or system overload. The
detection mechanism in this scenario implements this algorithm.
If a problem is detected, Reaction components are informed with details of
the attack (e.g., the source addresses of attackers and the severity of the attack,
which in this case relates to the magnitude of the disparity of expected and actual
response traffic volumes). Reaction can then initiate some form of remediation,
if necessary, or inform the Operator via Visualisation (not shown in Fig. 2).
Let us assume this attack is particularly intense and the network provider has
a contract to protect the Web server. In this instance, Reaction components
initiate a rate-limiting remediation mechanism. The severity of the rate-limiting
is dictated by the magnitude of the problem as determined by detection (as Xie
et al. propose [15]). Rate-limiting is invoked on the edge router associated with
the Web server (perhaps, initially) and on the ingress routers to the network
providing connectivity to the Web server.
When the rate-limiting is invoked on the ingress routers to the network, the
Detection component associated with the edge router will na¨ıvely assume the
attack has ended and inform Reaction of the end of the attack. Hence the with-
drawal of the remedy has to be determined by information from the remediation
components themselves. Here, the rate-limiting at the edge router near the Web
server could stop with the invocation of the remedy at the ingress routers.
4 Framework Realisation – Autonomic Distributed IDS
This section describes the design and implementation of Monitoring and De-
tection components of the INTERSECTION framework. If we assume that the
network is aware of itself, security assurance might be regarded as a service inher-
ently provided by the network infrastructure. In such a scenario, we can think
of a system capable of deploying, both proactively and reactively, on-demand
security services.
Fig. 3. A model for a distributed autonomic IDS
We propose a system (Fig. 3) which dynamically deploys the entities in charge
of providing network security, based on knowledge of the security status of the
network and its components. The Preprocessor and Broker entities implement
the Monitoring function, collectively the Detection Engine and Decision Engine
entities the Detection function, and the Autonomic Co-ordinator implements the
Reaction functionality. These entities are described in more detail below.
– Preprocessor
Each such component is in charge of:
1. capturing raw data from the network;
2. extracting information (e.g. traffic features, flow information, etc.) from
captured packets;
3. sending the computed information to a broker entity.
– Broker
The broker is a mediation component whose main tasks are:
1. collecting information from all of the preprocessors spread across the
network;
2. distributing the collected information to one or more detection engines.
The distribution strategy is defined by means of a policy-based approach.
– Detection Engine
Detection engines receive traffic information from the broker and decide on
whether or not such information represents a potential attack pattern, based
on a specific detection technique.
– Decision Engine
The main task of the decision engine resides in collecting information com-
ing from detection engines and coming up with a final decision concerning
the current network context. This might be done through a number of ap-
proaches, ranging from simple majority voting to much more complex solu-
tions in which the various inputs provided by the detection engines are ap-
propriately weighted on the basis of their degree of reliability (with respect
to their own capability of detecting a particular set of malicious activities).
Interaction between each detection engine and the decision engine might be
realised using the IDMEF (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format)
standard data format [8].
– Autonomic Coordinator
This entity is responsible for the coordination of the other system compo-
nents. It will work on the basis of a notification paradigm: the various system
components can be seen as information producers, whereas the coordinator
itself acts as an information consumer. Each time something worth report-
ing happens, an event is generated and captured by the coordinator which
triggers the appropriate configuration task, e.g. the invocation of some form
of Remediation activity.
In order to improve the system’s performance and reliability, a diversity-
based approach to the selection of detection techniques might be successfully
exploited. In fact, by integrating different mechanisms for attack classification,
the system may increase its detection capabilities, since more accurate analy-
sis can be performed in order to detect specific attacks. Support for reliability
evaluation can be added when multiple detection techniques are used, thus al-
lowing evaluation of the accuracy of each issued decision. A multi-classification
approach can be implemented either in a centralized or a distributed fashion:
the combination of multiple detection techniques can be used both locally, in
order to increase the reliability of alerts raised at each detection engine, and in a
distributed fashion, by combining evidence of events communicated by different
detection engines to the decision engine, in order to gain a global knowledge of
the overall security status of the monitored networking scenario.
Dynamic deployment of the distributed system components is needed in or-
der to ensure both flexibility of the architecture and robustness in the face of
changes in network and traffic conditions. As an example, the IDS might need
several preprocessors sniffing traffic in crucial points of the network, as well as
several detection engines, each exploiting the best fitting detection technique ac-
cording to the system status and node location. Such a dynamically distributed
system might, for instance, adapt itself at the occurrence of a DDoS attack, by
appropriately placing IDS engines in the most critical nodes (i.e., the nodes along
the attackers’ path) and by coordinating such nodes through a proper protocol
(e.g., a protocol for tracing back the attack).
5 Conclusion
We have presented a framework for deploying network intrusion-tolerance sys-
tems, taking into consideration: the cost of performing over-detailed, full-time
monitoring by adapting the level of monitoring according to current suspicions;
the need to deal with different kinds of intrusions and deploy different reme-
dies according to the available facilities of the network; the need to leave some
decisions to manual operation; the need to recover the network automatically.
We have shown how the framework is congruent with the implementation
plans described in Section 4. To date, a prototype implementation of the dis-
tributed IDS is being tested. For the autonomic coordinator, we have adopted
an approach based on the Grid services paradigm: it is based on the WS-GRAM
(Web Service Grid Resource Allocation and Management) module of the Globus
Toolkit4 and takes care of dynamically deploying the various system components.
Further work will involve investigating the suitability of our chosen approach
to recovery, i.e., not to work around the monitoring used to detect intrusions,
but to perform narrow-scope monitoring as part of remediation.
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